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Abstract
This article discusses integrative moral psychology, including moral
intuition and moral deliberation, to explain the mechanisms of actual
moral behaviors. To this end, we briefly review current models in the
field of moral psychology dealing with moral intuition and moral
reasoning, after which we present an integrative model based on these
earlier ones. Our model focuses on a moral intuitive process, a process
of reflection on initial emotional responses, moral reasoning, and moral
introspection. We critically examine and discuss recent research from
the rapidly growing fields of neuroscience and the natural sciences to
strengthen and support this model. In closing, we explore the
educational implications of our model and possible educational methods
to promote moral development.
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Ⅰ. Introduction
Among those who study moral philosophy and psychology,
the relationship between moral reasoning, moral intuition and
moral judgment has become one of the most controversial issues.
Haidt’s influential piece on emotion and reason in moral
judgment, “The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social
Intuitionist Approach to Moral judgment” (2001) has profoundly
affected the field of moral psychology, introducing with the
concept of “moral intuition.” Before Haidt, Kohlberg’s theory of
moral development and a neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral
functioning have consistently proposed that reasoning is the
main process in moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Rest,
Bebeau, & Volker, 1986; Rest et al., 1999; Thoma, 2006).
However, after Haidt’s study many scholars began to consider
the importance of intuition in moral judgment. Many moral
philosophers and moral psychologists have debated the priority
and importance of moral reasoning and moral intuition, and
relationship between the two (Haidt & Bjorklung, 2008a, 2008b;
Jacobson, 2008; Narvaez, 2008).
More recently, with the aim of integrating those two types
of psychological processes—moral reasoning and moral intuition
—several researchers have tried to examine the interactive
mechanism between moral intuition, reasoning and judgment.
However, few studies have dealt with actual decision-making
processes in the real world. For instance, in one of these studies,
Musschenga (2009) provides us with a new approach to
understanding the relationship between moral intuition and
moral reasoning in the context of a review of previous theories,
but does not nonetheless explain how actual moral
decision-making occurs via the mechanisms of moral intuition
and reasoning.
In this article we examine the field of integrative moral
psychology, including moral intuition and moral deliberation, to
explain the mechanisms of actual moral behaviors. To this end,
we first briefly review recent research related to moral intuition
and moral reasoning. We then suggest an integrative model of
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moral decision-making that considers more concrete processes,
before examining our model’s educational implications. In what
follows, we pose the following question: How can we pursue the
moral development of children and adolescents in accordance
with our model? In our answer, we discuss this question from a
“practical, descriptive” perspective, rather than from a
“normative” one, by looking to several scientific discoveries on
human moral functioning. In closing, we describe the
implications of our results for potential educational methods.
Ⅱ. The Kohlbergian Model
Historically, the importance of reason in moral functioning
has always featured prominently. In the eighteenth century,
Immanuel Kant argued that reason is related to the basis of the
determination of the will and is essential for principled morality
(Kant, 1999). Philosophically speaking, Kant’s concept of practical
and moral reasoning is related closely to individual or collective
practical reasoning about what one morally ought to do
(Richardson, 2007). More recently John Rawls has also argued
that the reasoning process is an important factor for inducing
the concept of justice (Wenar, 2008; Rawls, 2003). These
arguments have greatly influenced the Kohlbergian view of
moral psychology, which asserts the importance of reasoning and
principles in moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1973; Lapsley, 1996).
Basically, the Kohlbergians insist that a moral judgment and
its final result—that is, a moral action—is based on deliberation
and reasoning. Moreover, moral judgments occur by deliberating
and considering various moral principles that derive from the
stages of moral development (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). The
Kohlbergian approach to our moral judgment is rooted in
time-consuming processes: reasoning and deliberation.
More recently, neo-Kohlbergians have succeeded in
modifying this earlier model in response to various objections,
adding various other factors. In particular, Rest and his
colleagues have put forth a four-component model that consists
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of moral sensitivity, moral reasoning, moral motivation and
moral character. It is important to note that this model includes
not only moral reasoning but also the affective parts of moral
functioning (Rest, 1994; Rest et al., 1999; Narvaez & Rest, 1995).
This newer model of moral functioning sought to better explain
the actual mechanism of moral action than previous models,
which focused solely on reasoning.
Although this more recent model of moral functioning takes
in account affective factors, it nonetheless remains focused on
moral judgment rooted in moral reasoning (Rest et al., 1999;
Thoma, 2006). Of the four components of their model, moral
judgment plays a central role in decision-making when an
individual encounters a moral dilemma. The three other factors
relate to the perception of the situation, the commitment to
moral values, and in the persistence of moral behavior.
Questions that are more directly related to actual
decision-making, such as “What should I do?” or “Between these
possible solutions, which one should I choose?”, are dominated
by moral reasoning rather than by other factors. Also, Rest and
his colleagues primarily employ the Defining Issues Test, which
was invented to assess the reasoning process, for their
psychological studies (Rest, 1994; Rest, Bebeau, & Volker, 1986).
Undoubtedly, even the neo-Kohlbergians have focused extensively
on the reasoning process in their empirical studies.
These Kohlbergian models of moral functioning have
dominated research and thinking in the field of moral
psychology for roughly two decades. However, most recently,
with the development of scientific and cognitive psychological
approaches to human morality, arguments against the
Kohlbergian and neo-Kohlbergian models of moral judgment
have been proposed. In the next section we briefly review these
objections, which emphasize the role of moral intuition.
Ⅲ. Arguments for Moral Intuition: Haidt et al.
Our understanding of human morality is based partially on
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an empiricist version of moral intuitionism (sometimes called
“sentimentalism”) developed by eighteenth-century British
philosophers. They insisted that human morality came from the
non-rational part of man—from, for instance, his moral
sentiment. Also, they argued that the moral decision-making
process is basically unconscious and that it occurs immediately,
without a long period of consideration. David Hume (1711-1776),
Anthony Ashley Cooper, the earl of Shaftesbury (1621-1683) and
Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) were the major exponents of this
philosophical view (Hume, 1990; Cooper, 1990; Hutcheson, 1990;
Broadie, 2009). Their arguments conflict with the Kantian
approach toward human morality, which instead emphasizes the
importance of reason in moral judgment.
Contemporary moral psychologists, such as
Sinnott-Armstrong (2008a, 2008b), have recently begun to
re-examine moral intuition as it was conceived among earlier
moral intuitionists like Hume, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.
Sinnott-Armstrong defines moral intuition as strong and
immediate moral beliefs (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008a). Scholars who
focus on moral intuition argue that it is immediately, quickly, or
spontaneously initiated and that it directly causes moral
judgment (Shweder & Haidt, 1993). They have also argued that
this type of social cognitive process is automatic, pre-conscious,
implicit and prior to our reasoning or deliberation (Bargh, 1994;
Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
Perhaps the most prominent of this later group of
psychologists focusing on the moral-intuitionist view is Haidt.
According to him, moral intuition is defined as a psychological
process akin to aesthetic judgment: one sees or hears about an
event and one instantly feels approval or disapproval (Haidt,
2001). This occurs without any awareness. Haidt proposes a
social intuitionist approach to moral judgment that emphasizes
the role of an intuitive process in human moral functioning. In
his view, actual moral judgment occurs through moral intuition,
and moral reasoning usually produces reasons to justify
previously made intuitive judgments. Accordingly, he describes
the minor role of moral reasoning provocatively as the “rational
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tail of the emotional dog” (Haidt, 2001). According to his model,
moral judgment occurs through moral intuition in an immediate,
unconscious manner, and moral reasoning is merely a supportive
process. As we mentioned earlier, however, this model has been
to the subject of various counter-arguments. In the next section,
we discuss to the ways in which we might integrate these two
approaches into a model that accounts for both types of
psychological processes in explaining actual moral
decision-making. In turn, we explore the educational implications
of this integrated approach.
Ⅳ. The Integrative Model of Moral Reasoning,
Intuition and Feedback
To integrate moral reasoning and intuition into a model
explaining the process of moral decision-making, we begin with
moral intuition. The existence and process of moral intuition
cannot be denied when a person finds him- or herself in an
urgent situation that threatens another’s life or welfare. This type
of situation often appears in the popular press or media. For
instance, we can consider the heroic act of Lee Su-hyun at a
Tokyo subway station.
“In January 2001, a South Korean student named Lee
Su-hyun was waiting for the subway in Tokyo when a Japanese
man fell on the tracks. Lee and another Japanese man jumped
onto the rails in an attempt to get him out of the way before an
oncoming train reached the station. Sadly, they were unsuccessful
and all three men were killed.” (Soh, 2008)
Lee and the other man drew upon an intuitive process that
emerged in response to the urgency of seeing another human in
a life-threatening situation. Although this decision resulted in the
death of all three men, it highlights the difference between
intuition and reasoning. If they had relied solely on deliberative
moral decision-making, they would not have been able to
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respond immediately. Instead, they would have undergone a
process requiring greater deliberation and thus time. However, as
the situation in the subway shows, time was of the essence and
intuition forced them to make a quick decision.
In fact, neuroscientific studies on human brain processes
show the ways in which these intuitive processes are performed.
A recent fMRI study done by Young et al. (2007) demonstrated
that people can make faster decisions when they are faced with
an “intentional harm condition.” These reaction times were much
faster than those experienced during “neutral situations” or
under an “attempted harm condition.” The effects of these
experiments on reaction-time differences show us under what
kinds of moral dilemmas our moral intuitive processes are
immediately activated. We can interpret such results in the
following fashion: if people face a situation with clear and
consistent information that indicates that victims are threatened
by dangerous, harmful conditions, they can then make a moral
decision faster using intuitive processes. With this in mind, we
argue that the intuitive process initiates the moral
decision-making process, especially in urgent situations involving
another’s welfare. These moral intuition processes resemble those
described by Haidt (2001).
However, such an intuitive process cannot solely be applied
to moral decision-making in all situations. Sunstein (2008) argues
that the existence of plural and conflicting accounts of the
foundations of morality makes this type of intuitive, immediate
process insufficient for assessing complex situations. Also,
Narvaez (2008), in objecting to Haidt and his intuitive model,
argues that actual, daily moral decision-making usually includes
a consideration of the moral principles of a person and that it
can be connected to “practical wisdom” rather than to simple
intuitive processes. This type of counter-argument highlights for
us the fact that, in many situations, especially complex situations
involving conflicting values, we cannot solely rely on moral
intuition to make a decision, because doing so can potentially
lead to errors.
Additionally, Musschenga (2009) has argued that moral
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intuition lacks reliability and that we have no determinate way
in which to trust our intuitive moral judgments. As a result, he
insists that deliberate reasoning should work in conjunction with
the intuitive process to make up for the weaknesses of moral
intuition. His argument is convincing, offering an integrated view
of decision-making, unlike earlier studies, which focused on only
one side of moral decision-making.
Musschenga thus offers a useful theoretical framework on
the ways in which to integrate moral intuition with moral
reasoning. In what follows, we apply this model to actual,
practical moral decision-making processes. We also ask how
moral reasoning, a slower process, might cooperate with the
intuitive process in our model. In order to show the necessity of
this model, we begin by examining earlier models that have
solely emphasized moral intuition while neglecting the value of
moral reasoning. We do not behave solely as the result of an
intuitive process, even if moral intuition has influenced a
concrete behavioral decision. Although scholars argue correctly
that intuition “orders” us, they ignore the possibility that there
is still a chance to deny intuitive commands. This can be
demonstrated through reference to several neuroscientific
electroencephalographic experiments, conducted by
neuropsychologists who are interested in the possibility of
human free will in the decision-making process.
One such an experiment, conducted by Libet (1999), seems
to confirm the existence of free will and its ability to intervene
in unconscious decision-making. In Libet’s experiment, we make
an unconscious decision 550ms (milliseconds) before an actual
behavior occurs. However, 300ms after the unconscious decision,
we can employ consciousness as a mean of preventing our
behaviors. People are capable of stopping their decisions for
100-150ms by employing consciousness and free will. During
these 100-150ms, Libet argues that we can change our mind not
to follow, or to “veto,” the unconscious decision. Haggard and
Libet (2001) conclude that while free will does not appear to
initiate a voluntary process, it could still act as a control agent.
Ramachandran (1998) has also commented on this experimental
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result that “our conscious minds may not have free will but
rather ‘free won’t’.”
From these studies we can conclude that a person can make
conscious decisions. Thus, while earlier scholars have offered
nuanced arguments about decision-making, they tend to agree on
a number of key points, from “we can deny our unconscious
decisions with our consciousness” to “we can make conscious
decisions voluntarily.” All of those scholars have argued that our
conscious process exists and that the process can affect
previously made unconscious decisions (Dennett, 2003).
Gazzaniga (2006) cautions, however, that these ideas are based
on a form of neuroscientific determinism, which views the brain
as automatic. Such ideas cannot explain everything. We should
therefore keep in mind other factors, such as social choice,
interactions, moral values, and free-will (Champagne & Curley,
2005; Schilbach et al., 2006; Haggard, 2008).
As a result, we can conclude that actual human behavior
does not rely exclusively upon intuitive processes and that both
conscious and unconscious processes are involved in moral
decision-making. A very short period of time between the end of
the intuitive process and the behavioral result makes it
impossible to stop the connection through the process of
deliberate reasoning. Therefore, we need to explore an alternative
route to stop the connection. According to Zajonc (1980), hot,
affective reactions occur prior to and much faster than cold,
reasoning processes. Recent studies on the human brain point
out that the direct thalamic pathway, where emotional processes
occur, is much faster than the cortical pathway. But the thalamic
pathway cannot process the same type of complex information
as the cortical pathway (LeDoux, 1995; 1996). Moreover, the
emotional process in the human brain seems to block intuitive,
immediate responses toward problematic situations. Because such
processes are faster than reasoning processes, they offer a
possible explanation of those couple of hundreds of milliseconds
of “free will.”
Working from Libet’s study (1999), Haggard and Libet (2001)
have argued that, in the “chasm” between the completion of an
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intuitive process and the occurrence of a resultant behavior, we
can pause and prevent an inappropriate behavior from
beginning. This raises the question of just what kind of
mechanism operates in the chasm. Through common sense, we
can easily catalogue a range of feelings, like questioning,
hesitation and doubt that check our behavior. In fact, Haidt
(2003) suggests that several self-conscious emotions, such as
shame, embarrassment and guilt, can be related to moral
functioning, offering checks to people’s dispositions. In addition,
one ought to consider common sense and its mechanism from a
more philosophical and psychological perspective.
Greene and his colleagues have provided neuroscientific
evidence proving that some emotional responses alert us to the
“inappropriateness” of previous, instant responses in particular
situations, thus delaying final decision-making (Greene et al.,
2001). If these types of emotions occur at the “conscious
hundreds-of-milliseconds moment,” then we start to see that
there are several problems with an intuitively made judgment.
At that moment, we can “veto” the immediate response and
prevent the occurrence of a behavioral result. We can then
activate our cortical pathway – moral reasoning – for reflection
and evaluation, in order to find another response.
By what standard, then, can we evaluate these emotional
responses? To answer this question, we can turn to Aristotle. He
argues that “righteous indignation,” as a point of equilibrium
between envy and spite, is the pain or distress we feel at the
misfortunes of others (Aristotle, 2007; Striker, 1996). If we face
emergent situations that may severely threaten another’s life or
welfare, we make an intuitive judgment to undertake some
action to solve the problem. Then, if our emotional response at
the moment is coherent with our intuitive judgment, in this case
righteous indignation, we can or are compelled to act on our
judgment to affect the emergent situation. In other words, in this
case, we may feel a sense of duty or obligation to act. If we
failed to act immediately on this judgment, then we would not
be able to save others in a similar situation, in which time is of
the essence. On the other hand, for a case in which our
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emotional response leads us to hesitate, instead of leading to a
sense of obligation (Westermarck, 2009), we may veto our
previously made judgment and begin a reasoning process.
At this point we encounter another mechanism, moral
reasoning. As mentioned earlier, this mechanism is slower than
the intuitive or emotional pathway. It occurs in the most
evolved, slower parts of the human brain, such as the prefrontal
cortex, and farther away from the most primitive parts that
operate more quickly, such as the limbic system (Damasio, 1998;
Waltz et al., 1999; Sherwood, 2010). Basically, in the social
intuitionist model, Haidt (2001) proposes that our reasoning
merely supports the results of moral intuition. However, Pizzaro
and Bloom (2003) have argued that deliberation or reasoning can
modify or override the result of the intuitive process. Also,
Greene et al. (2004) have shown that if we confront difficult and
complex moral dilemmas, the anterior cingulate cortex and the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which are involved in abstract
cognitive processes, are more active than when we deal with
easy problems.
In addition, some proponents of such an integrative model
have argued for the importance of moral reasoning in moral
judgment. Guthrie and his colleagues (2009) have suggested that
an important component of good judgment is the ability to
know when we can, or must, rely on intuitive processes and
when we should override them through reasoning and
deliberation. Musschenga (2009) comes to a similar conclusion,
arguing that good judgment requires educated intuition and
insight, both of which allow us to override and modify intuitive
processes by deliberation.
Such studies suggest the importance of reasoning: when we
face complex problems that seemingly cannot be properly solved
solely through an intuitive process, our reasoning process takes
over and potentially overrides the intuitive process. Although the
reasoning process is much slower than the unconscious,
immediate intuitive process, it can nonetheless help us to solve
complex problems by forcing us to consider various aspects of a
given problem. In fact, psychological and neuroscientific studies
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have shown that this process does not simply follow moral
intuition, as Haidt has suggested. Instead, it has the ability
modify the judgment provided by moral intuition, when the
intuitive result produces a negative emotional response. The
reasoning process can even directly participate in moral
judgment when the problem at hand is highly abstract or
sophisticated.
Figure 1. The integrative model of moral reasoning and moral intuition
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Our model (see Figure 1) can be summarized as follows.
First, if we encounter a difficult situation, our intuitive process is
immediately activated. In most situations, this intuitive process
will be initiated. However, as Greene et al. (2004) have shown,
in situations that are highly abstract and impersonal, our
reasoning process can be activated immediately. If the situation
is imminent, a great deal of harm to others’ lives or welfare can
be anticipated, and if few or no emotional obstacles impede the
actor, then intuitive judgment will directly result in the agent’s
behavior. However, if an agent feels “negative emotions” after
the intuitive process—within that gap of hundreds of
milliseconds—and if the situation is not so imminently harmful,
then the intuitive process will not result in a given behavior. In
such circumstances, a moral reasoning process is activated to
evaluate or adjust the results of the intuitive process. If the
dilemma is more abstract and impersonal, the reasoning process
can be activated instead of the intuitive process. The reasoning
process in turn might confirm or override the conclusion drawn
by moral intuition.
To clarify, let’s consider a few possible examples. Let’s start
with a situation in which the immediate moral intuitive process
directly causes actual moral behavior. Consider the
above-mentioned case, Lee Su-hyun’s heroic behavior in Tokyo
subway. He recognised the urgency of the situation, and failed
to feel any morally negative emotions that would have
dissuaded his intuitive decision. As a result, he instantly jumped
onto the subway tracks. Sometimes, though, an actor will modify
his or her initial intuitive decision as a result of the reasoning
process. Think of a simplified case of the Heinz dilemma
(Kohlberg, 1981). Would a man, whose wife is near death, steal
an unreasonably expensive medicine to save her life? Impulsively
and immediately, this man might feel an urge to steal the
medicine. That is the result of his intuitive moral judgment.
After a while, however, he feels guilty about and moral disgust
at his initial, anti-moral decision. Eventually he chooses to follow
his own moral standard and modifies his initial decision after
the moral reasoning process, deciding not to steal the medicine.
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Such a hypothetical example shows that an initial intuitive
decision, which causes negative emotions, can be modified by
the reasoning process. Finally, sometimes people initially activate
their reasoning processes rather than intuitive processes. For
instance, when a teacher attempts to establish behavioral
standards in her classroom in advance of the beginning of a
semester, she will consider abstract, general moral norms such as
“Do not lie” or “Serve the public good,” which may be derived
from Kantian or utilitarian theories. In such a process, hardly
would such a teacher start with the moral intuition. She follows
instead the processes of deliberation and reasoning. In the next
section, we explore the implications of this model for education.
We consider how to promote the proper moral development of
people in accordance with our model.
Ⅴ. Educational Implications of Our Model
With this model, we can sketch several educational
implications that might help improve overall morality, including
individuals’ moral intuition, moral emotion, and moral reasoning.
First, we need to consider how we might facilitate the
development of an intuitive process in moral functioning. The
development of moral intuition ought to make an individual act
morally in urgent situations, when an immediate response is
needed to protect the lives or welfare of others. Educational
interventions are one such way to enhance students’ moral
intuition skills, allowing them, when they encounter a pressing
and morally problematic situation, to offer both a proper and
immediate response.
Various studies in education have attempted to formulate
proper methods that might facilitate intuitive skills. Hogarth
(2001) suggests that we can acquire intuitions, which embody
tacit or implicit knowledge, by learning processes and by
learning from experience. In terms of intuition education,
Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ (1991) developmental model of ethical
expertise suggests that the acquisition of intuitive ethical skills
An Integrative Model of Moral Reasoning and Moral Intuition 95
may imitate the acquisition of practical skills, such as driving a
car or playing chess. Dreyfus and Dreyfus also suggest
educational methods that might enhance intuitive skills.
Nonetheless, they were unable to successfully provide systemized
educational models that enhance the domain of moral intuition.
As a result, we might benefit from a consideration of more
sophisticated educational studies, which are directly related to
educational methodology, in searching for models to improve
moral intuition.
An expertise approach to moral character appears to be a
promising educational model for effectively facilitating the
development of moral intuition. Narvaez and her colleagues
suggest “four levels of ethical skill instruction” (Narvaez, 2006;
Narvaez et. al., 2004; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005). Their levels
involve immersion in examples and opportunities, an attention to
facts and skills, practice procedures, and an integration of
knowledge and procedure. Based on this model, they suggest an
‘expert-in-training pedagogy.’ This theory includes a
well-structured environment, the simultaneous learning of theory
and skills, and focused practice. Its goal is to encourage students
to have higher levels of expertise in order to encourage the
formation and application of moral intuitions.
In addition, we ought to consider educational intervention in
order to improve emotional functioning in morality. As we have
suggested in our model, emotional functioning plays a critical
role in controlling intuitive reactions. For an educational method
to improve such emotional skills, we can turn to work in the
field of Social and Emotional Learning (SEL). The field of SEL
has emerged from these new understandings of the nature of
biology, emotions and intelligence and their relation to success
and happiness (Cohen, 1999; Shriver, Schwab-Stone, & DeFalco,
1999). Moreover, many SEL applications have undergone various
trials in actual educational situations. As a result, SEL might
provide us with an effective and systemized educational
methodology with which to develop students’ social-emotional
skills. We need such skills to understand and to reflect upon our
emotional states. Moreover, these skills also enhance our
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emotional skills, allowing us cope with our emotional states.
Again, as suggested above, skilled emotional reflection is
necessary for us to determine whether or not to follow an
intuitive process. SEL might just be a reliable way to enhance
such necessary skills.
Simply put, SEL is a process that helps youths to develop
fundamental skills for an effective life, teaching them how to
handle themselves, their relationships, and their work effectively
and ethically. It includes recognizing and managing emotions,
developing care and concern for others, establishing positive
relationships, making responsible decisions, and handling
challenging situations constructively and ethically (CASEL, 2010a).
According to the proponents of SEL, social and emotional
competencies are necessary for desirable moral outcomes.
Therefore, we ought to create the sort of atmosphere that can
teach and scaffold social and emotional competences (CASEL,
2010b; Elias et al., 2008).
Given that we want to focus on emotions that are directly
related to “morals,” of the various educational methodologies in
SEL we can direct our attention to self-awareness, self-regulation
and self-reflection skills. These include pausing and considering
our feelings, i.e., cueing self-monitoring (Elias et al., 1997). These
educational interventions, according to our model, can thus force
us to consider our emotional responses (e.g., shame,
embarrassment, and guilt), when we encounter immediate moral
intuitions.
Finally, we should consider how to develop moral reasoning
skills. Numerous educational methodologies have attempted to
improve moral reasoning skills, following the Kohlberg and the
neo-Kohlbergians. This article suggests that traditional educational
methodologies, tested and established by moral educators, might
be useful in improving one’s general moral reasoning ability.
Such educational methodologies include moral-dilemma
discussions, the just community approach, as well as other
strategies (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977; Higgins, 1995; Snarey &
Smuelson, 2008; Hildebrandt & Zan, 2008).
In addition to traditional educational approaches to moral
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reasoning, we also consider “moral introspection.” Most simply,
in psychology, the word “introspection” refers to a process
through which each of us can “look within” ourselves to observe
and then report on the contents of our thoughts. With
introspection, we can examine our own mental images, describe
them, and discover what information they contain (Gleitman,
Reisberg, & Gross, 2007).
Traditionally, moral psychologists have mainly understood
the meaning of moral reasoning and moral judgment as
processes with which to make actual behavioral decisions (Rest
et al., 1999; Kohlberg, 1973). In our model, however, the ability
to reason enables moral introspection, and becomes important,
especially in an educational context. Locke (2005, 2009) argued
that, without our introspection, we cannot properly perceive and
identify the underlying meanings of immediate emotional
responses. In such a process, our reasoning ability enables us to
monitor our inner states, especially our initial emotional
responses, allowing us to properly modify the emotional
functions of our minds. As a result, we ought to acknowledge
the role of reasoning processes on introspection, and their ways
in which such processes enable appropriate coordination among
intuition, emotional responses, and reasoning.
Therefore, if we explore the educational implications of
moral reasoning from the standpoint of moral introspection, then
in our model moral reasoning would mean that a person tries to
reflect on the content of his or her intuitive process through
deliberative reasoning, even when such reasoning might offer
little or no correct or valuable information about how one ought
to behave. Furthermore, we should teach the skills of moral
reasoning, allowing the individual to consider the
appropriateness of moral intuition in accordance with moral
principles. In this way, when we are developing students’ moral
reasoning, we should focus not only on improving their ability
to make good moral decisions, but also on their introspective
ability to evaluate and monitor the results of immediate intuitive
and emotional processes.
As a result of reflection and introspection, a person has the
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ability to judge whether or not the result of a given intuition is
morally acceptable. This is based on “cognitive dissonance,”
which acts as a type of emotional motivation to self-correct
behaviors and attitudes (Festinger, 1985; Dienstbier et al., 1975).
If a person undertakes a behavior that does not coincide with
that person’s notion of what is right, it may induce cognitive
dissonance, which will provide the motivation to correct the
previous result. Because we have a “moral self” or a “moral
identity,” as moral psychologists suggest, our moral
understanding will be integrated into our moral self and will
then have a closer link between moral motivation and the
manifestation of emotion (Blasi, 1984, 1995, 2004). Accordingly,
we conclude that the result of an introspective process could
produce cognitive dissonance. Finally, this internal dissonance
could generate motivations to modify the moral decisions
resulting from immediate, intuitive, and emotional processes.
In fact, there are several examples that prove that this
deliberative, introspective process can affect the intuitive process.
For instance, Selman (1971) has shown that, by role-taking, we
can induce a modification to a child’s intuitive processes, so that
he or she produces a reciprocal form through deliberation and
reflection. Also, Haidt (2007), in reference to the idea of a
synthesis in moral psychology, has shown that the reflective
process may occur after intuitive judgment, modifying its result.
Finally, it is our sense that all of these educational interventions
should be carefully conducted in an attempt to induce overall
moral development in students, including moral intuition,
reasoning or deliberation, and actual behavior.
Ⅵ. Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the ways in which one
might develop an integrative model of moral functioning that
links moral reasoning to moral intuition. To create an
appropriate model to explain actual moral behavior, we briefly
reviewed several scientific studies, including research in the area
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of neurobiology, to examine the psychological basis of our moral
functioning. According to our actual pattern of decision-making
and behavior, we also considered what types of factors should
work depending on each phase in the moral decision- making
process. In closing, we discussed the possible educational
methodologies that might enhance one’s overall moral
functioning ability that allows us to engage in actual moral
actions.
However, there is no way for this paper to explain in full
all of the relevant phenomena and to provide a complete set of
educational implications. Further studies should be conducted to
unearth a more sophisticated and accurate theoretical framework
to explain the concept of moral functioning presented here, and
to develop effective methods for moral education that will
enhance the overall moral abilities of students—from moral
intuition to moral introspection. Because our moral functioning
cannot be fully explained by any lone factor—that of intuition or
reasoning – an integrative theoretical framework and
educational methods based on such a framework should be
established. In our view, such questions are a promising area of
research for the near future.
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